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Abstract
This paper introduces a model of oculomotor control during the smooth pursuit of occluded visual targets. This model is
based upon active inference, in which subjects try to minimise their (proprioceptive) prediction error based upon posterior
beliefs about the hidden causes of their (exteroceptive) sensory input. Our model appeals to a single principle – the
minimisation of variational free energy – to provide Bayes optimal solutions to the smooth pursuit problem. However, it
tries to accommodate the cardinal features of smooth pursuit of partially occluded targets that have been observed
empirically in normal subjects and schizophrenia. Specifically, we account for the ability of normal subjects to anticipate
periodic target trajectories and emit pre-emptive smooth pursuit eye movements – prior to the emergence of a target from
behind an occluder. Furthermore, we show that a single deficit in the postsynaptic gain of prediction error units (encoding
the precision of posterior beliefs) can account for several features of smooth pursuit in schizophrenia: namely, a reduction in
motor gain and anticipatory eye movements during visual occlusion, a paradoxical improvement in tracking unpredicted
deviations from target trajectories and a failure to recognise and exploit regularities in the periodic motion of visual targets.
This model will form the basis of subsequent (dynamic causal) models of empirical eye tracking measurements, which we
hope to validate, using psychopharmacology and studies of schizophrenia.
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Introduction
This paper is about the optimality principles that underlie
oculomotor control and how one can account for particular
failures in optimal control in both computational and neurobio-
logical terms. Specifically, we consider the smooth pursuit of visual
targets with periodic motion and the effect of visual occlusion on
smooth pursuit eye movements. This provides a nice (a well
understood and empirically studied) paradigm to model eye
movements, using schemes that can be motivated from basic
(Bayes optimality) principles. Furthermore, by appealing to
neurobiologically plausible implementations of Bayes optimal
schemes – such as active inference – one can simulate the effect
of neuromodulatory deficits on optimal oculomotor behaviour and
understand these deficits in computational terms. In what follows,
we describe and demonstrate a model of smooth pursuit under
visual occlusion and try to reproduce some common deficits seen
in schizophrenia. This paper serves to introduce the model and its
phenomenology. In subsequent papers, we will use this model as
the basis of an observation or dynamic causal model to optimise its
parameters using empirically recorded eye movements. This
should allow us to test the model assumptions using psychophysical
and pharmacological interventions which, if successful, may
provide non-invasive measures of synaptic function mediating
smooth pursuit eye movements.
The model of smooth pursuit presented below is based upon the
notion of active inference. Active inference is a corollary of the
principle of free energy minimisation and says that we sample
sensory inputs to minimise prediction errors. Clearly, prediction
errors depend upon predictions and inference on hidden states of
the world causing sensory data. A crucial aspect of this inference is
the proper weighting of sensory evidence and prior beliefs – in the
context of uncertainty about hidden states. Operationally, this
rests upon weighting prediction errors in accord with their
precision. In neurobiologically plausible implementations of active
inference, precision is thought to be encoded by the postsynaptic
or neuromodulatory gain of neuronal populations encoding
prediction errors [1]. This is important, because many psychopa-
thologies implicate modulatory neurotransmitter systems and a
putative failure of postsynaptic gain control. We will exploit this
link to simulate the failures of active inference (during smooth
pursuit eye movements) that are typical of schizophrenia – whose
pathophysiology is thought to involve abnormalities of dopami-
nergic and NMDA receptor function [2].
The aim of this work was to produce a model of Bayes optimal
oculomotor control that could account for the cardinal features of
smooth pursuit in normal subjects and three characteristic deficits
seen in schizophrenia:
N When normal subjects track a predictable target, compelling
psychophysical and modelling studies suggest that they
anticipate the reappearance of the target from behind an
occluder. On target disappearance, eye velocity decreases to
zero unless the subject expects the target to reappear, in which
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case – after an initial deceleration – eye velocity increases
again [3]. This is taken as evidence that subjects have an
internal representation of target motion that is used to provide
top-down oculomotor control in the absence of visual input.
N Schizophrenics show a diminished gain in pursuit movements
– from about 85 to about 75% – especially when a target is
occluded: in normal subjects, at velocities of around 20deg/s,
the ratio of mean eye and target velocities falls to around 60 to
70% during occlusion, while in schizophrenia it drops to 45 to
55% [4]. In other words, schizophrenics produce slower (more
uncertain) pursuit movements when the target is occluded.
N Paradoxically, schizophrenics show better than normal
performance in the brief period after a target unexpectedly
changes direction: for around 30 ms – they change their eye
velocity to match the target velocity more accurately than
normal subjects [5].
N Schizophrenics fail to recognise or exploit regularities in
successive repetitions of target trajectories, during smooth
pursuit: normal performance on the first presentation of a
target trajectory is imperfect but – after repeated presentations
– normal subjects come to match it optimally, whereas
schizophrenics do not [6].
In brief, we were able to explain anticipatory smooth pursuit eye
movements using a hierarchical model of target motion that
provided top-down (extra-retinal) predictions about hidden motion
during visual occlusion. By reducing the precision of these top-
down (empirical prior) beliefs, we were able to simulate the three
abnormalities above; namely, a slowing of smooth pursuit during
visual occlusion, a paradoxical increase in the accuracy of tracking
unexpected motion and a failure to recognise regularities in target
motion. In short, with a single change in an otherwise optimal
scheme, we were able to explain three established signs of
schizophrenia – in a neurobiologically plausible fashion.
This paper comprises five sections. In the first, we represent a
brief review of empirical and theoretical studies of smooth pursuit
and visual occlusion; with a special focus on findings in
schizophrenia research. The second section reviews active
inference from basic principles and shows how it can be
implemented in the brain in terms of predictive coding. This is
particularly important here, because the predictive coding
formulation highlights the importance of precision weighted
prediction errors and the role of postsynaptic gain or neuromo-
dulation in optimising perceptual inference in cortical hierarchies.
The third section describes our generative or forward model that
produces smooth pursuit eye movements. The behaviour of this
generative model, when exposed to periodic motion, is illustrated
using simulations that highlight anticipatory movements during
periods of visual occlusion. The fourth section revisits the
simulations of normal (Bayes optimal) pursuit when the precision
of hierarchical prediction errors is reduced. In the final section, we
consider how subjects accumulate evidence about periodicity of
target trajectories that they can use to nuance smooth pursuit,
when trajectories are repeated. We conclude with a discussion of
the implications of these simulation results and how the model can
be used in a more pragmatic way to verify some of its assumptions
and quantify its parameters using empirical data.
Smooth pursuit eye movements and schizophrenia
This section provides a short overview of the smooth pursuit eye
movement (SPEM) literature, with a particular focus on the
phenomena disclosed by visual occlusion and eye movements in
schizophrenia. We will use some of these key findings – at least
heuristically – to motivate the form of the model used in later
sections. We also appeal to studies reviewed here to motivate the
potential importance of schizophrenia as a lesion-deficit model of
false inference, caused by neuromodulatory failures in the
encoding of precision or uncertainty.
Our aim in this and future work is to build a neurobiologically
plausible computational model of an inferential process that is
abnormal in both schizophrenia and those at high genetic risk. If
lesioning the model – in a way that is consistent with known
pathology in schizophrenia – can reproduce abnormalities of
perceptual inference, then we might be able to: (i) quantify model
parameters using empirical data (from both behavioural and
neuroimaging studies), and (ii) interpret other abnormalities in
schizophrenia as similar ‘lesions of inference’ in other brain
systems.
The inferential process we have chosen to model is that of
SPEM. There are several reasons motivating this choice. First,
abnormal SPEM is a good candidate endophenotype for
schizophrenia, with an effect size of around one [7]. Second,
unlike brainstem-derived saccadic eye movement, SPEM is a
cortically driven process [8], whose output is not modified
downstream of the frontal eye fields [9]; it is therefore amenable
to investigation by magnetoencephalography (MEG). Third, its
behavioural expression can be recorded precisely and quantita-
tively using an eye tracker.
Attempts to quantify SPEM abnormalities in schizophrenia
have used both global and specific measurements. Global
measurements – e.g., qualitative measures or measures of the
average distance from the eye to the target – yield the highest
effect sizes, but cannot pinpoint an underlying deficit [10]. More
specific measurements include gain: gain is defined as the ratio of
eye velocity to target velocity during either the initial open-loop
phase – in which the effects of eye movement on target fixation
have not yet reached the cortex – or the closed-loop maintenance of
pursuit. Other measurements include the numbers of catch-up
saccades – that re-fixate a target – or intrusive saccades that de-
fixate a target. Although most SPEM measurements are abnormal
in schizophrenia, decreased maintenance gain is the specific
measure with the largest effect size and narrowest confidence
intervals (mean d 20.87+/20.13, in [10]). This has led several
authors to conclude that a fundamental problem in schizophrenia
is a lag of the eye behind the target, with a compensatory increase
in catch-up saccades [11,12]. This conclusion is reinforced by data
from the relatives of schizophrenics, who also show diminished
maintenance gain (mean d 20.42), albeit without a concomitant
increase in catch-up saccades [13]. Note that impaired pursuit is
not the only fundamental problem in schizophrenia: others include
reduced response inhibition, found in anticipatory and anti-
saccade performance.
Why does the eye lag the target in schizophrenia? Attempts to
answer this question have tested components of existing models of
predictable SPEM, such as that proposed by Barnes [14]. Other
models include the pioneering models of unpredictable pursuit
[15,16] and more recently neural network models implementing
optimal control theory [17]. The Barnes model comprises modules
for: retinal image velocity detection, gain control – that transforms
the representation of target motion into oculomotor commands;
efference copy of the oculomotor command – to continue pursuit
during brief target occlusion; and a short-term velocity memory –
that can learn and store trajectories over longer periods, allowing
better anticipation of target movement. All of these functions have
been shown to be abnormal in schizophrenia; namely, velocity
detection [18] – subsequently attributed to problems using
efference copy [19], the maintenance of target motion represen-
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tation or its use in generating oculomotor commands [20], and the
learning or anticipation of trajectories [6].
Investigators have tried to explain these apparently disparate
problems in terms of an underlying functional abnormality. One
such function – that has long been suspected to be aberrant in
schizophrenia – is that of prediction: specifically, the prediction of
sensory input. In one of the best validated explanations of a
psychotic symptom, Frith [21] proposed that passivity experiences
(delusions of control) could result from the failure of a forward
model to predict accurately the sensory consequences of a motor
command. He argued that if the feeling of agency for a movement
depends upon the accurate prediction of its consequences – rather
than the mere issuing of the motor command – this feeling could
be lost if the prediction failed. Schizophrenics have been
demonstrated to have deficits in predicting the sensory conse-
quences of their actions in numerous paradigms; e.g., force-
matching [22], retinal motion attribution [23], visuomotor [24]
and virtual reality [25] – and in the latter three experiments,
prediction deficits correlated with the strength of their passivity
experiences.
Prediction deficits – or more formally, a weakened influence of
prior expectations on perception and learning [26] – have also
been proposed to underlie many other phenomena in schizophre-
nia. Examples include: decreased susceptibility to illusions such as
the size-weight illusion [27] and the hollow mask illusion [28],
increased susceptibility to the rubber hand illusion [29], decreased
susceptibility to conditioning effects such as latent inhibition [30]
and Kamin blocking [31], and numerous electrophysiological
phenomena [32].
If schizophrenic prediction deficits underlie the lag of eyes
behind their targets, then one would expect to see greater SPEM
abnormalities in tasks with a greater predictive component.
Indeed, smooth pursuit of a pseudorandom stimulus in schizo-
phrenia is no different to that of controls’: a deficit only becomes
apparent once the target motion is sinusoidal, i.e. predictable [33].
Researchers have also addressed this hypothesis using paradigms
in which SPEM does not depend on target motion, but on extra-
retinal signals; i.e., predictions of target motion. Such paradigms
involve the use of occluders or a technique called foveal
stabilization, in which – unknown to the subject – eye tracker
feedback is used to keep the target foveated for a brief period,
which ensures that eye movement is driven purely by expectation,
not by retinal slip of the image.
In normal subjects – asked to maintain pursuit during target
disappearance – occlusion causes eye velocity to fall after around
200 ms until it stabilizes (at around 450 ms) at roughly half the
initial velocity. This ‘residual predictive pursuit’ can be maintained
for at least 4 seconds [34]. If the reappearance of the target is
predictable (e.g., using a constant occluder size), eye velocity
increases – after a few hundred milliseconds – back toward target
velocity, although interestingly this anticipatory acceleration is not
time locked to the target’s reappearance [3].
Several metrics have been used to characterise the predictive
element of SPEM [4]. The ‘mean predictive gain’ is the average
gain during occlusion (by an occluder in the middle of a ramp).
Excluding the initial deceleration period gives the ‘residual
predictive gain’. An even purer measure of memory-driven
prediction can be obtained by placing the occluder at the point
at which a target changes direction – so that the eye’s change of
direction must be driven solely by past experience: in this context,
the ‘peak predictive gain’ is derived from the peak eye velocity/
expected target velocity during the occlusion.
There is evidence that these predictive measures are more
sensitive to schizophrenic SPEM dysfunction than the popular
‘maintenance (closed-loop) gain’. Thaker and colleagues [4]
showed that mean predictive gain was lower in schizophrenics,
even at the low velocity of 9deg/sec, when their maintenance gain
is normal. Similarly, in their study of the first degree relatives of
schizophrenics and community subjects both with and without
schizotypal personalities, they showed no group differences in
maintenance gain, but the schizotypal relatives had significantly
poorer residual predictive gain [35]. Interestingly, the relatives’
peak predictive gain was also significantly poorer, irrespective of
whether they were schizotypal or not. Similar results were
obtained from a large community subject sample, in which all
schizotypal individuals (disorganized subtype) had significantly
lower residual predictive gain [36], whereas only the high-scoring
(.2SD) disorganized schizotypal subjects had diminished mainte-
nance gain [37].
Two other findings suggest that predictive pursuit measures
something quite distinct from maintenance gain, and that this
distinct predictive component could be a more specific endophe-
notype for schizophrenia: in both normal and schizotypal
individuals, residual pursuit deficits are independent of mainte-
nance gain; indeed, in normal subjects they were weakly anti-
correlated at high speed [36,38]. Predictive pursuit gain also has a
much higher heritability (as measured in schizophrenics and their
siblings) than maintenance gain – 0.9 versus 0.27 respectively –
indicating that it has a much more specific genetic component
[39].
The latter study demonstrates why one should not assume that
the meta-analytic finding [10] that maintenance gain has a larger
effect size than predictive measures in schizophrenia (0.87 with
95% confidence intervals 0.74–0.99 versus 0.35 and 0.37 with
95% confidence intervals up to 1 but both including zero) implies
that it is closer to a core neurobiological deficit. In fact, the
opposite is true: maintenance gain is likely to be affected by other
disease-related factors, and the authors comment that its greater
effect size may well be due to the disparity in the numbers of
studies examining maintenance (42) versus predictive (5) gain –
and the fact that the former is based on a greater proportion of the
eye movement record than the latter. Indeed, Hong and
colleagues showed that refining the predictive pursuit measure
can substantially increase its effect size (in schizophrenic’s
relatives): from 0.23 (residual predictive gain) to 0.49 (peak
predictive gain) to 0.87 (using foveal stabilisation) [20].
Two further potential consequences of predictive deficits in
schizophrenia are important to note: the first is the finding that
impaired performance of the initial ‘open-loop’ segment of smooth
pursuit is not due to poor immediate processing of velocity
information, but due to impaired learning of target trajectories
over trials; hence control and schizophrenics perform equally
badly on the first trajectory presentation, but controls subsequently
learn the trajectory; i.e. they are better able to predict trajectories
on the basis of past experience [6]. The second is an example of a
rare scenario, in which schizophrenics perform better than
controls: when there is an unexpected change in target trajectory,
the former show higher maintenance gain than controls in the
120–150 ms period after the trajectory change [5]. As the authors
comment, this finding supports the idea that schizophrenics – and
their relatives [40] – compensate for their problems in predicting
target motion by increasing their reliance on immediate sensory
information. This is consistent with the finding that schizophrenics
have decreased frontal (predictive) and increased occipitotemporal
(sensory) activations on fMRI during SPEM compared with
controls [41]. These findings relate to those of Voss and colleagues
[42], who measured the predictive and retrospective binding of
actions and their effects in time – in schizophrenics and controls –
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demonstrating that the schizophrenics showed no predictive
component but an increased retrospective (reactive) component
relative to controls.
The concept of the brain as a predictive coding network [43], or
an inference engine, performing perceptual inference and learning
using empirical Bayes [44] allows one to frame predictive
pathology in schizophrenia within Bayesian models of psychosis
[45–47]. In such models, the relative contribution of top-down
prior expectations and bottom-up sensory evidence (or prediction
error) to a percept is determined by their relative precisions.
Decreased precision at higher levels of a predictive coding
hierarchy attenuates the contribution of top-down predictions –
called empirical priors – to a percept. In predictive coding
schemes, this attenuates prediction errors at high levels of the
hierarchy, leading to a failure of optimal prediction and greater
prediction errors at the sensory level. Interestingly, abnormal
prediction error responses have been demonstrated in the
midbrain in both reward-related [48] and associative learning
tasks [49] in schizophrenia, and these provide a compelling
explanation for abnormal salience [50]. This failure of optimal
prediction also explains the diminished mismatch negativity and
P300 potentials (a failure to predict regularities and consequent
violations) and the increased P50 auditory potential (a failure to
predict the auditory input) in schizophrenia [32]. In summary, the
role of precision in balancing the confidence in top-down prior
beliefs, in relation to sensory evidence, is crucial for optimal
inference. Functionally, both delusions and hallucinations could be
regarded as instances of false inference [51]. Under predictive
coding, this false inference is expressed in terms of an abnormal
modulation of prediction error responses, which provides a
compelling explanation for some neurophysiological abnormalities
seen in schizophrenia. In the next section, we consider predictive
coding in more detail and the key role of precision in active
inference.
Generalised filtering, free energy and active inference
This section sets out the basic theory used in the simulations. It
introduces active inference in terms of generalised predictive
coding or Bayesian filtering. We will start with a very general
formulation of these schemes using the concept of variational free
energy. In brief, active inference can be regarded as equipping
standard Bayesian filtering schemes with classical reflex arcs that
enable action to fulfil predictions about hidden states of the world.
We will describe the formalism of active inference in terms of
differential equations describing the dynamics of the world and
internal states of the visual-oculomotor system. The neurobiolog-
ical implementation of these differential equations is then
interpreted in terms of predictive coding, which includes
prediction errors on the motion of hidden states – such as the
location of a visual target. This scheme is used in subsequent
sections to simulate smooth pursuit eye movements under visual
occlusion and different levels of uncertainty (precision) about
hierarchical predictions.
The scheme used to model smooth pursuit eye movements in
this paper has been used to model several other processes and
paradigms in neuroscience (see Table 1). This active inference
scheme is based upon just three assumptions:
N The brain minimises the free energy of sensory inputs defined
by a generative model.
N The generative model used by the brain is hierarchical,
nonlinear and dynamic.
N Neuronal firing rates encode the expected state of the world,
under this model.
The first assumption is the free energy principle, which leads to
active inference in the embodied context of action. The free
energy here is a proxy for Bayesian model evidence that is easy to
compute (see Text S1). In Bayesian terms, minimising free energy
means that the brain maximises the evidence for its model of
sensory inputs [52–58]. This is the Bayesian brain hypothesis
[59,60]. If we also allow action to maximise model evidence we get
active inference [61]. In this setting, desired movements are specified
in terms of prior beliefs about state transitions or the motion of
hidden states in the generative model. Action then realises prior
beliefs (policies) by sampling sensory input to provide evidence for
those beliefs.
The second assumption above is motivated by noting that the
world is both dynamic and nonlinear and that hierarchical
structure emerges inevitably from a separation of temporal scales
[62,63]. The final assumption is the Laplace assumption that, in
terms of neural codes, leads to the Laplace code, which is arguably
the simplest and most flexible of all neural codes [64]. See Text S2
for a motivation of the Laplace assumption from basic principles.
Under these assumptions, action and perception can be
regarded as the solutions to coupled differential equations
describing the dynamics of the real world and the behaviour of
an agent. These equations can be expressed in terms of action and
internal states that encode conditional expectations about hidden
states of the world [61]:
s~g(x,v,a)zvv
_x~f(x,v,a)zvx
_a~{LaF(~s,~m)
_~m~D~m{L~mF(~s,~m)
ð1Þ
See Figure 1 for a schematic summary of the implicit conditional
dependencies implied by Equation (1). For clarity, real-world states
are written in boldface, while internal states of the agent are in
Table 1. Processes and paradigms that have been modelled
using generalised filtering.
Domain Process or paradigm
Perception Perceptual categorisation (bird songs) [68]
Novelty and omission-related responses [68]
Perceptual inference (speech) [90]
Sensory learning Perceptual learning (mismatch negativity)
[69]
Attention Attention and the Posner paradigm [1]
Attention and biased competition [1]
Motor control Retinal stabilization and oculomotor reflexes
[61]
Saccadic eye movements and cued reaching
[61]
Motor trajectories and place cells [91]
Sensorimotor integration Bayes-optimal sensorimotor integration [61]
Behaviour Heuristics and dynamical systems theory [92]
Goal-directed behaviour [73]
Action observation Action observation and mirror neurons [91]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.t001
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italics (for a glossary of mathematical symbols used here, see
Table 2). The , notation denotes variables in generalized
coordinates of motion where, using the Lagrange notation for
temporal derivatives: ~s~(s,s’,s’’, . . . ) [65]. The pairs of equations
are coupled because sensory states s(t) depend upon action
through hidden states and causes (x,v), while action a(t) depends
upon sensory states through internal states ~m(t). The first pair of
coupled stochastic differential equations describes the dynamics of
hidden states and causes in the world and how these generate
sensory states. These equations are stochastic because sensory
states and the motion of hidden states are subject to random
fluctuations (vv,vx). The second pair of differential equations
corresponds to action and perception respectively – they constitute a
gradient descent on variational free energy.
The last differential equation describing perception is known as
generalised filtering or predictive coding and has the same form as
standard Bayesian (Kalman-Bucy) filters – see also [43,66]. The
first term is a prediction based upon a differential operator D that
returns the generalised motion of the conditional expectations –
such that D~m~(m’,m’’,m’’’, . . . ). The second is an update term that
ensures the changes in conditional expectations are Bayes-optimal
predictions of hidden states of the world – in the sense that they
maximise (the free energy bound on) Bayesian model evidence.
To perform simulations using this scheme, one simply integrates
or solves Equation (1) to simulate (neuronal) dynamics that encode
conditional expectations and ensuing action. Conditional expec-
tations depend upon a generative model, which we assume has the
following (hierarchical) form
s~g(1)(x(1),v(1))zv(1)v
_x(1)~f (1)(x(1),v(1))zv(1)x
..
.
v(i{1)~g(i)(x(i),v(i))zv(i)v
_x(i)~f (i)(x(i),v(i))zv(i)x
..
.
ð2Þ
This equation is just a way of writing down a generative model
that specifies a probability density function over sensory inputs and
hidden states and causes. This probability density is needed to
define the free energy of sensory input (see Text S1): it is specified
in terms of some functions and Gaussian assumptions about
random fluctuations (v(i)x ,v
(i)
v ) on the motion of hidden states and
causes. It is these that make the model probabilistic – they play the
role of sensory noise at the first level and induce uncertainty about
states at higher levels. The (inverse) amplitudes of these
fluctuations are quantified by their precisions (P(i)x ,P
(i)
v ).
The deterministic part of the model is specified by nonlinear
functions (g(i),f (i)) of hidden states and causes that generate
dynamics and sensory consequences. Hidden causes link hierar-
chical levels, whereas hidden states link dynamics over time.
Hidden states and causes are abstract quantities that the brain uses
to explain or predict sensations – like the motion of an object in
the field of view. In hierarchical models of this sort, the output of
one level acts as an input to the next. This input can produce
Figure 1. Exchange with the environment. This schematic shows the dependencies among various quantities modelling exchanges of an agent
with the environment. It shows the states of the environment and the system in terms of a probabilistic dependency graph, where connections
denote directed dependencies. The quantities are described within the nodes of this graph – with exemplar forms for their dependencies on other
variables (see main text). Hidden (external) and internal states of the agent are separated by action and sensory states. Both action and internal states
– encoding a conditional probability density function over hidden states – minimise free energy. Note that hidden states in the real world and the
form of their dynamics can be different from that assumed by the generative model; this is why hidden states are in bold. See main text for further
details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.g001
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complicated convolutions with deep (hierarchical) structure. We
will see examples of this later.
Perception and predictive coding
Given the form of the generative model (Equation 2) one can
write down the differential equations (Equation 1) describing
neuronal dynamics in terms of prediction errors on the hidden
causes and states. These errors represent the difference between
conditional expectations and predicted values, under the gener-
ative model (using A:B :~ATB and omitting higher-order terms):
_~m
(i)
x ~D~m(i)x z
L~g(i)
L~m(i)x
:P(i)v ~e
(i)
v z
L~f (i)
L~m(i)x
:P(i)x ~e
(i)
x {D:P(i)x ~e(i)x
_~m
(i)
v ~D~m(i)v z
L~g(i)
L~m(i)v
:P(i)v ~e
(i)
v z
L~f (i)
L~m(i)v
T
:P(i)x ~e
(i)
x {P
(iz1)
v ~e
(iz1)
v
~e(i)x ~D~m(i)x {~f (i)(~m(i)x ,~m(i)v )
~e(i)v ~~m
(i{1)
v {~g
(i)(~m(i)x ,~m
(i)
v )
ð3Þ
Equation (3) can be derived fairly easily by computing the free
energy for the hierarchical model in Equation (2) and inserting its
gradients into Equation (1). This gives a relatively simple update
scheme, in which conditional expectations are driven by a mixture
of prediction errors, where prediction errors are defined by the
equations of the generative model.
It is difficult to overstate the generality and importance of
Equation (3) – its solutions grandfather nearly every known
statistical estimation scheme, under parametric assumptions about
additive noise [67]. These range from ordinary least squares to
advanced variational deconvolution schemes. In this form, one can
see clearly the relationship between predictive coding and
Kalman-Bucy filtering – changes in conditional expectations ~m(i)
comprise a prediction (first term) plus a weighted mixture of
prediction errors (remaining terms). The weights play the role of a
Kalman gain matrix and are based on the gradients of the model
functions and the precision of random fluctuations.
In neural network terms, Equation (3) says that error-units ~e(i)
receive predictions from the same hierarchical level ~m(i{1)v and the
level above ~m(i)v . Conversely, conditional expectations (encoded by
the activity of state units) are driven by prediction errors from the
same level ~e(iz1)v and the level below ~e
(i)
v . These constitute bottom-
up and lateral messages that drive conditional expectations
towards a better prediction to reduce the prediction error in the
level below. This is the essence of recurrent message passing
between hierarchical levels to suppress free energy or prediction
error: see [68] for a more detailed discussion. In neurobiological
implementations of this scheme, the sources of bottom-up
prediction errors, in the cortex, are thought to be superficial
pyramidal cells that send forward connections to higher cortical
areas. Conversely, predictions are conveyed from deep pyramidal
cells by backward connections, to target (polysynaptically) the
superficial pyramidal cells encoding prediction error [69,70].
Equation (3) shows how precision P(i) plays an important role in
weighting the influence of prediction errors ~e(i) at any particular
level of the hierarchy. In other words, by changing the precision
on the prediction errors, we can bias inference towards sensory
Table 2. Glossary of mathematical symbols.
Variable Short description
y)f~x,~vg
y)f~x,~vg
Hidden states and causes (boldface – real and italic – assumed)
~x(t)~½x,x’,x’’, . . .T Generalised hidden states
~v(t)~½v,v’,v’’, . . .T Generalised forces or causes that act on hidden states
~s(t)~½s,s’,s’’, . . .T Generalised sensory states caused by hidden states
~vx(t)~½vx,v’x,v’’x, . . .T Generalised random fluctuations in the motion of hidden states
~vv(t)~½vv,v’v,v’’v, . . .T Generalised random fluctuations in hidden causes
Pi Precision (inverse covariance) of generalised random fluctuations
~g(~x,~v,~a)
~f(~x,~v,~a)
Sensory mapping and equations of motion generating sensory states
~g(~x,~v)
~f (~x,~v)
Sensory mapping and equations of motion modelling sensory states
a(t) Action
{ln p(~s) Surprise or negative log evidence of generalised sensory states
F (~s,~m)§{ln p(~s) Free-energy bound on surprise
q(yD~m) Recognition density on causes with sufficient statistics ~m
~m(t)~f~mx,~mvg Conditional or posterior expectation of hidden states and causes
~g(t)~½g,g’,g’’, . . .T Prior expectation of generalised hidden causes
~e(i)x ~D~m(i)x {~f (i)(~m(i)x ,~m(i)v )
~e(i)v ~~m
(i{1)
v {~g
(i)(~m(i)x ,~m
(i)
v )
Generalised prediction error on the motion of hidden states and causes at the i-th
hierarchical level
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.t002
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information or top-down (empirical) priors – empirical priors are
simply beliefs encoded probabilistically that provide top-down
constraints on hierarchically lower levels. Crucially, in the current
context, precision corresponds to the gain of (superficial pyrami-
dal) populations encoding prediction error and has been discussed
as mediating attention and action selection [1,71]. In later
sections, we will change precision to simulate pathology of
synaptic gain and consequent failures of hierarchical inference.
Figure 2 provides a schematic of the proposed message passing
among hierarchically deployed cortical areas.
Action
In active inference, conditional expectations elicit behaviour by
sending predictions down the hierarchy to be unpacked into
proprioceptive predictions at the level of (pontine) cranial nerve
nuclei and spinal-cord. These engage classical reflex arcs to
suppress proprioceptive prediction errors and produce the
predicted motor trajectory
_a~{LaF~{(La~e(1)v ):P
(1)
v ~e
(1)
v ð4Þ
The reduction of action to classical reflexes follows because the
only way that action can minimize free energy is to change sensory
(proprioceptive) prediction errors by changing sensory signals; cf.,
the equilibrium point formulation of motor control [72]. In short,
active inference can be regarded as equipping a generalised
predictive coding scheme with classical reflex arcs: see [61,73] for
details. The actual movements produced clearly depend upon
Figure 2. Hierarchical message passing in the visual-oculomotor system. Schematic detailing a neuronal message passing scheme
(generalised Bayesian filtering or predictive coding) that optimises conditional expectations about hidden states of the world, given sensory (visual)
data and the active (oculomotor) sampling of those data. This diagram shows the speculative cells of origin of forward driving connections (in red)
that convey prediction error from a lower area to a higher area and the backward connections (in black) that construct predictions [70]. These
predictions try to explain away prediction error in lower levels. In this scheme, the sources of forward and backward connections are superficial (red)
and deep (black) pyramidal cells respectively. The equations on the right represent a generalised descent on free energy under the hierarchical model
described in the main text – this can be regarded as a generalisation of predictive coding or Kalman filtering: see [67]. State-units are in black and
error-units are in red. Here, we have placed different levels of some hierarchical model within the visual-oculomotor system. Visual input (illustrated in
the retinal input graph) arrives in an intrinsic (retinal) frame of reference that depends upon the angular position of a stimulus and the direction of
gaze. Exteroceptive input is then passed to the lateral geniculate nuclei (LGN) and to higher visual (we are merging V1–V5) and prefrontal (e.g., frontal
eye fields) areas in the form of prediction errors. Crucially, proprioceptive sensations are also predicted, creating prediction errors at the level of the
cranial nerve nuclei (pons). The special aspect of these proprioceptive prediction errors is that they can be resolved through classical reflex arcs – in
other words, they can elicit action to change the direction of gaze and close the visual–oculomotor loop.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.g002
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(changing) top-down predictions that can have a rich and complex
structure.
Summary
In summary, we have derived equations for the dynamics of
perception and action using a free energy formulation of adaptive
(Bayes-optimal) exchanges with the world and a generative model
that is both generic and biologically plausible. A technical
treatment of the material above will be found in [65], which
provides the details of the generalised filtering used to produce the
simulations in the next section. Heuristically, these simulations
simply involve integrating or solving equation (1), given a
generative model in the form of equation (2). The integration
scheme we use is described in Text S3 and can be considered a
simulation of neuronal processing with predictive coding (equation
3) and oculomotor reflexes (equation 4) – this is active inference.
Methods
This section introduces the generative model for smooth pursuit
used to illustrate normal behaviour and, in the next section, the
abnormal behaviour that results from changing the precision of
prediction errors in hierarchical inference. In brief, the neuronal
simulations require us to specify the equations of motion and
sensory mapping from the real world and the corresponding
functions that constitute a subject’s generative model. To
reproduce anticipatory eye movements, during visual occlusion,
we require a hierarchical generative model that represents hidden
motion. For simplicity, we will only consider (horizontal) motion in
one dimension and ignore vertical motion.
Oculomotor following model
The generative model for smooth pursuit eye movements used
here is very simple and is based upon the prior belief that the
centre of gaze and target are attracted to a common (fictive)
attractor in visual space. The process generating sensory inputs is
however much simpler and can be expressed as follows:
s~
so
st
" #
~
x(1)o
O(x
(1)
t )
:exp({(½{8, . . . ,8zx(1)o {x(1)t )2)
" #
zv(1)v
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ð5Þ
This pair of equations corresponds to the noisy sensory mapping
from hidden states and the equations of motion for those states in
the real world. The real world provides sensory input in two
modalities (see Figure 2): proprioceptive input from cranial nerve
nuclei reports the (horizontal) angular displacement of the eye
so[R and corresponds to the centre of gaze in extrinsic coordinates
x(1)o . Exteroceptive (retinal) input reports the angular position of a
target in a retinal (intrinsic) frame of reference st[R
17|1. This
input models the response of 17 visual channels, each equipped
with a Gaussian receptive field with a width of one angular unit
and deployed at intervals of one angular unit – about 2u of visual
angle. This input can be occluded by a function of target location
O(x
(1)
t )[½0,1, which turns values between zero and one, such that
whenever the target location x
(1)
t is behind the occluder, retinal
input st falls to zero. The response of each visual channel depends
upon the distance of the target from the centre of gaze. This is just
the difference between the oculomotor angle and target location in
an extrinsic frame of reference: x(1)o {x
(1)
t .
The hidden states of this model comprise the oculomotor states
– oculomotor angle and velocity(xo,x’o)and the target location
xt[R. Oculomotor velocity is driven by action and decays to zero
with a time constant of eight time bins or 8|16~128
milliseconds. This means the action applies forces to the
oculomotor plant, which responds with a degree of viscosity.
The target location is perturbed by the hidden cause v[R that
describes the location to which the target is drawn (a sinusoid),
with a time constant of one time bin or 16 ms. More specifically,
changes in target location _x(1)t are driven by the difference between
an attracting position v(1) and its current location x
(1)
t . In this
paper, the random fluctuations on sensory input and the motion of
hidden states were virtually absent, with a log precision of 16. In
other words, the random fluctuations have a variance
ofexp({16). This completes our description of the process of
generating sensory information; in which hidden causes produce
horizontal motion of a target location and action forces
oculomotor states. Target location and oculomotor states are
combined to produce sensory information about the target in an
intrinsic (retinal) frame of reference over an array of sensory
channels.
The generative model has a similar form to equation (5) but
with two important exceptions: there is no action and the motion
of the hidden oculomotor states is driven by the same hidden cause
that moves the target. In other words, the agent believes that its
gaze is attracted (v(1){x(1)o ) to the same fictive point in visual space
that is attracting the target (v(1){x
(1)
t ). Second, the generative
model is equipped with a deeper (hierarchical) structure that can
represent periodic trajectories in the hidden cause of target
motion:
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These equations constitute the probabilistic model of how
sensations are generated in the form of Equation 2. This model
defines the free energy in Equation 1 – and specifies behaviour
under active inference. The sensory mapping of the generative
model is exactly the same as above. The equations of motion for
the hidden oculomotor states and target location are very similar;
apart from the fact that oculomotor velocity is now driven by the
displacement between the oculomotor angle and hidden cause.
However, in the generative model hidden causes are informed by
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the dynamics of hidden states at a second level _x(2). These hidden
states model underlying periodic dynamics using a simple periodic
attractor
x
(2)
2
{x
(2)
1
" #
that produces sinusoidal fluctuations of any
amplitude and a frequency that is determined by a second level
hidden cause v(2)with a prior expectation of g. This prior
expectation corresponds to beliefs about the frequency of periodic
motion of the target. In the simulations below, we used a fixed
prior, which was set to the correct frequency with a wavelength of
56 (simulation with occluders) or 32 (remaining simulations) time
bins. The log precisions on the random fluctuations in the
generative model were three at the first (sensory) level and minus
one at the higher level, unless stated otherwise. This means that
the agent is more confident about its sensory input than it is about
how that sensory input will evolve, as determined by the (motion
of) hidden states and causes. This situation is equivalent to that of
an experimental subject viewing a pursuit paradigm for the very
first time: [s]he can see the target clearly but is uncertain of its
amplitude and frequency until it has completed at least one cycle.
In the last section, we will reduce the precision on the hidden
causes at the second level to simulate inference on the periodicity
of the target trajectory on repeated exposure.
Having specified the generative process and model, we can now
solve the active inference scheme in Equation 1 and examine its
behaviour. This generative model produces smooth pursuit eye
movements because it embodies prior beliefs that its gaze and the
target are attracted by the same hidden causes. This smooth
pursuit rests on conditional expectations about the target location
in extrinsic coordinates and the state of the oculomotor plant,
where target location is driven by hidden causes that also have to
be inferred.
Results
Simulating normal subjects
Figure 3 reports the conditional expectations about hidden
states and causes during the simulation of smooth pursuit eye
movements, using horizontal sinusoidal target motion with a
period of 56 time bins – starting at 16 time bins. Crucially, the
target was occluded whenever it passed behind an occluder at a
leftward displacement of 0.1u to 1.8u of visual angle.
The upper left panel shows the predicted sensory input
(coloured lines) and sensory prediction errors (dotted red lines)
along with the true values (broken black lines – which are almost
superimposed). Here, we see fluctuations in the predicted sensory
input during smooth pursuit where, crucially, these inputs fall to
zero during periods of occlusion (these sensory fluctuations are
shown in image format in Figure 4). The proprioceptive sensations
(blue lines) reflect a veridical smooth pursuit, even during
occlusion. These sensory predictions are based upon the condi-
tional expectations m(1)x of hidden oculomotor (blue line) and target
(red line) angular displacements shown on the upper right. The
grey regions correspond to 90% Bayesian confidence intervals and
the broken lines show the true values. One can see clearly the
target motion that elicits pursuit responses that follow with a short
delay of about two time bins (about 32 ms). The hidden cause of
these displacements is shown (broken black line) with its
conditional expectation m(1)v (blue line) on the middle left. Note
the profound increase in uncertainty about this hidden cause
during the periods of occlusion; however, this uncertainty not
complete, because the hidden cause is informed by the motion of
hidden states at the second level – shown on the middle right.
These show the anticipated periodic dynamics of appropriate
amplitude to minimise prediction errors at lower levels in the
hierarchy. The period of these dynamics is fixed by a hidden cause
at the second level, as shown on the lower left. The true cause and
action are shown on the lower right. The action (blue line) is
responsible for oculomotor displacements and is driven by
proprioceptive prediction errors. For our purposes, these simula-
tions can be regarded as Bayes optimal solutions to the smooth
pursuit problem.
Figure 4 shows the same results in a different format: the top left
panel shows the responses of sensory channels in image format as a
function of peristimulus time. This shows the small fluctuations in
signal that are due to imperfect pursuit and consequent retinal slip
at the onset of target motion. Later, during periods of occlusion,
the sensory input disappears. The lower panels show the angular
displacement (top) and velocity (bottom) of the target (solid lines)
and eye (broken black lines) as a function of peristimulus time (we
will consider the red lines later). From the angular displacement
trace, one can see that after some initial uncertainty about the path
of the target (its speed and amplitude), the eye tracks the target
fairly accurately.
These results illustrate two important aspects of pursuit behind
occluders: initial effects and anticipatory effects. The first time the
target passes behind the occluder, the eye tracks its location quite
well to begin with, but after around 100 ms the eye velocity drops
significantly and it lags the target. When it emerges at 900 ms the
eye must then make a saccade-like movement to catch up with the
target (although not as fast as a real saccade – taken to exceed at
least 30u per second [74], as indicated by the broken horizontal
line). Aside from the latency and speed of corrective saccades,
which are not the focus of our modelling, this sequence is typical of
normal subjects’ pursuit behind occluders: e.g. see Figure 1 in [38].
On the second and third cycles of target occlusion, the eye’s
tracking is much better, because the agent has inferred the hidden
target motion – as its conditional expectations about hidden states
become entrained by its sensations. The anticipation of the target
motion is so good that it only lags the target when the latter is
accelerating (at 1800 ms and 2700 ms). The improved tracking of
an occluded target when its reappearance is anticipated is also a
well-documented finding [3]; in some cases, pursuit velocity
behind the occluder does not drop at all, e.g. Figure 8 in [75].
Summary
In summary, to account for anticipatory pursuit movements that
are not apparent in target motion, one needs to equip generative
models with a hierarchical structure that can accommodate latent
dynamics that may or may not be expressed at the sensory level.
Hierarchical extensions of this sort emphasise the distinction
between visual motion processing and oculomotor control based
purely upon retinal and proprioceptive input – they emphasise
extra-retinal processing that is informed by prior experience and
beliefs about the latent causes of visual input. These beliefs and
associated inference are disclosed nicely by visual occlusion. In the
next section, we look at simulated lesions to this Bayes optimal
pursuit behaviour as a metaphor for the deficits seen in
schizophrenia.
Simulating psychopathology
In this section, we make one simple change to the generative
model and repeat the simulations of previous section. The putative
deficit in schizophrenia – reduced high-level precision – can be
modelled by reducing the precision on the prediction errors at the
highest level of the hierarchy. One can see how this affects
conditional predictions in the first equality in equation (3) – see
also Figure 2: lowering the precision P(2)x reduces the contribution
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of prediction errors to the conditional expectations modelling
(hidden) periodic motion of the target. This results in a slowing of
the (empirical prior beliefs about the) target trajectory, as
confidence in the prediction errors on its motion falls. Normally,
this would place more emphasis on bottom-up prediction errors to
guide the trajectory; however, during occlusion these are simply
absent and, in principle, we should see the behavioural effect of the
ensuing loss of certainty or precision.
To model this deficit, we introduced a small reduction in the log
precision of prediction error on the motion of hidden states at the
second level of the generative model, from 21 to 21.25.
Neurobiologically, this corresponds to a reduction in the
postsynaptic gain of superficial pyramidal cells encoding prediction
error in cortical areas responsible for representing high-level
statistical regularities in target motion. This reduction in gain in
schizophrenia may involve interactions between classical modula-
tory neurotransmitter systems and NMDA receptor function (see
the Discussion). To examine the effects of the simulated lesion on
smooth pursuit during visual occlusion, we repeated the above
simulation:
Figure 4 shows the resulting sensory sampling (upper right
panel) and underlying angular positions and velocities of the target
and eye (red broken lines) in the lower top and bottom panels
respectively. Comparison with the corresponding results under
normal precision (black broken lines) shows some typical
properties of schizophrenic pursuit. First, the reduced precision
Figure 3. Simulation of smooth pursuit of a partially occluded target. This figure reports the conditional estimates of hidden states and
causes during the simulation of smooth pursuit eye movements, using horizontal sinusoidal target motion with a period of 56 time bins – starting at
16 time bins. All times are measured in 16 ms time bins. The target was occluded whenever it passed behind an occluder at a leftward displacement
of 0.1u to 1.8u of visual angle. The upper left panel shows the predicted sensory input (coloured lines) and sensory prediction errors (dotted red lines)
along with the true sensory input (broken black lines). The different coloured lines correspond to photoreceptor activity over the array of (17) sensory
inputs. The proprioceptive sensations (blue lines) reflect a veridical smooth pursuit, even during occlusion, indicated by the light grey bars. These
sensory predictions are based upon the conditional expectations of hidden oculomotor (blue line) and target (red line) angular displacements shown
on the upper right. The grey regions correspond to 90% Bayesian confidence intervals and the broken black lines show the true values. The hidden
cause of these displacements (broken black line) is shown with its conditional expectation (blue line) in the middle left panel where the prediction
error on this hidden cause shown as a dotted red line. Note the increase in uncertainty about this hidden cause during the periods of occlusion;
however, this uncertainty is moderated because the hidden cause is informed by the motion of hidden states at the second level – shown on the
middle right. These show the anticipated periodic dynamics of appropriate amplitude to minimise prediction errors at lower levels in the hierarchy.
The period of these dynamics is fixed by the hidden cause at the second level, as shown on the lower left – where the conditional expectation (blue
line) reaches its prior expectation almost immediately. The true cause and action (Equation 5) are shown on the lower right. The action (blue line) is
responsible for oculomotor displacements and is driven by proprioceptive prediction errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.g003
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trace is disproportionately affected by target occlusion: at the end
of occlusion, the lag behind the target is much greater than the
normal precision trace on four out of six occasions: including those
in which the target is actually decelerating. This is despite the fact
that when the target is visible and pursuit is stabilized, the
‘schizophrenic’ tracking is no different to that of the normal eye
(1200–1400 ms and 2000–2200 ms). This echoes empirical
findings in schizophrenic pursuit at modest speeds (see Table 2
in [4]). Second, the reduced precision trace is more inaccurate on
the third cycle than the first: it shows much less anticipatory
behaviour than the normal trace. Indeed, it lags so much just prior
to 2700 ms that it has to make a catch-up saccade when the target
re-emerges (note the pathological catch up saccade exceeds 30u
per second). We shall return to this precision-dependent difference
in learning in our final simulation.
Overall, these results are consistent with findings in schizophre-
nia that suggest an impaired ability to maintain veridical pursuit
eye movements in the absence of visual information. Furthermore,
they suggest that the computational mechanism that underlies this
failure rests on a failure to assign precision or certainty to
(empirical) prior beliefs about hidden trajectories.
Perhaps a relative loss of certainty about top-down predictions
could also explain the ability of schizophrenics to respond to
unpredicted changes in direction of the target. To explore this
possibility, we removed the occluder, decreased the target period
to 32 time bins, and introduced an unexpected reversal in the
motion of the target – at the beginning of the second cycle of
motion (at around 780 ms). We then repeated the simulations
using a normal generative model and the generative model with a
second level precision deficit of 24 (a greater precision deficit is
required to demonstrate effects when occluders are absent,
because sensory precision is relatively high). The results of the
simulations are shown in Figure 5, in terms of the angular
displacements and velocities shown in the previous figure. The
traces in black correspond to normal pursuit and the traces in red
show the performance under reduced precisions. Although the
effect is small (as it is in real subjects [5]), the schizophrenic
simulation (red lines) shows more accurate pursuit performance,
Figure 4. Smooth pursuit of a partially occluded target with and without high-level precision. The panels of this figure show the results
of the previous in a different format: the upper left panel shows the responses of each of the (17) photoreceptors in image format as a function of
peristimulus time. This shows the small fluctuations in signal that are due to imperfect pursuit and consequent retinal slip at the onset of target
motion. Later, during periods of occlusion, the sensory input disappears. The lower panels show the angular displacement (top) and velocity (bottom)
of the target (solid lines) and eye (broken lines) as a function of peristimulus time. The grey area corresponds to the period of visual occlusion. The
equivalent results – when the precisions of prediction errors on the motion of hidden states at the second level were reduced from a log precision of
21 to 21.25 – are shown in the upper right panel and as red broken lines in the lower panels. The broken horizontal line in the lower panel
corresponds to an angular velocity (30u/s) at which the eye movement could be considered saccadic. Please refer to the main text for a detailed
description.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.g004
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both in terms of the displacement between the target and centre of
gaze and in terms of a slight reduction in the peak velocity during
the compensatory eye movement – a movement that is nearly fast
enough to be a saccade. These differences are highlighted by pink
circles.
Summary
In summary, a single manipulation – that has some construct
validity, in relation to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia – can
account for both impaired smooth pursuit eye movements during
occlusion and the paradoxical improvement of responses to
unpredictable changes in target direction. This dissociation makes
perfect sense from the point of view of the computational anatomy
we have modelled here – reducing synaptic gain (precision) at high
levels of a hierarchical Bayesian inference or predictive coding
scheme reduces confidence in predictions that impairs perfor-
mance when these predictions are needed (during occlusion) and
that improves performance when they are not (during unpredicted
motion). In the simulations so far, we have assumed that the top-
down predictions are veridical and that all the simulated subjects
have properly inferred that the period of sinusoidal motion. In the
final section, we look at how these beliefs are acquired:
Acquiring prior beliefs
In this section, we briefly show that this Bayes optimal scheme
can easily infer the dynamics of target motion through optimising
its conditional expectation about the frequency of periodic motion.
This can be regarded as an experience-dependent accumulation of
evidence about the periodicity of target movement, during
repeated exposure to the trajectory. This is a fairly difficult
problem to solve, because active inference is actually changing the
sensory samples at a timescale that is fairly close to the periodicity
that needs to be inferred. However, if we accumulate information
sufficiently slowly – by placing appropriately informative priors on
the hidden causes at the second level – then we can use predictive
coding to establish posterior beliefs about statistical regularities in
target motion that can then be used as prior beliefs for subsequent
trials.
To simulate this experience-dependent inference, we simply
repeated the simulation of periodic motion in the absence of an
occluder. To model a subject who anticipated sinusoidal motion
but had no expectations about its frequency, we increased the log
precision on the (second level) hidden states encoding the
sinusoidal motion (from minus one to three), and reduced the
log precision on the (second level) hidden cause encoding the
frequency of periodic motion (from minus one to minus four), with
a prior expectation of zero. The left-hand panels of Figure 6 show
the results of this simulation using same format as Figure 4. It can
be seen that pursuit performance is virtually the same as it was
under visual occlusion. The key difference here is that the hidden
states at the second level only attain the correct amplitude after
nine cycles of motion. This is accompanied by a slow rise in the
hidden causes at the third level (blue line) to the true level (broken
black line) shown in the pink circle on the lower left – this is the
inferred frequency of periodic motion. This slow rise reflects the
evidence accumulation and optimisation of the posterior or
conditional expectation about the periodicity of motion as more
and more sensory evidence becomes available. Note that there is
no discernible improvement in performance – afforded by
recognising periodic motion – because the target is visible at all
times and provides precise visual information. However, as we
have seen the previous section, a failure to properly infer periodic
motion can produce profound deficits during visual occlusion.
The key question now is whether the 3 log unit deficit in
precision used in the previous section to reproduce the behavioural
deficits seen in schizophrenia, also accounts for a failure to infer or
recognise periodic target motion. As noted above, schizophrenics
seem to have particular difficulty in recognising and exploiting
statistical regularities with consequent failures of SPEM relative to
control subjects after, and only after, exposure to repeated
movement trajectories [6]. The right-hand panels of Figure 6
show the results of the same simulation of experience-dependent
inference reported in the left panels but using the generative model
with reduced precision. Crucially, this simulated lesion completely
abolishes the evidence accumulation and consequent inference
about periodic motion (pink circle on the right).
Summary
There is some evidence to suggest that schizophrenics are
unable to recognise or make inferences about target trajectories, in
the context of smooth pursuit eye movements. The simulation
results in this section suggest that these inferences are confounded
by the same reduction in precision used to simulate schizophrenic
pathophysiology in the previous section. The mechanism here is
Figure 5. Smooth pursuit with an unexpected trajectory
change, with and without high-level precision. This figure reports
the results of simulations using an occluded periodic motion with a
reversal in the direction of the trajectory at the beginning of the second
cycle (plain black line). The broken traces in black correspond to normal
pursuit and the broken traces in red show the performance under
reduced precision. Although the effect is small, the low precision
simulation shows more accurate pursuit performance, both in terms of
the displacement between the target and centre of gaze and in terms
of a slight reduction in the peak velocity during the compensatory eye
movement (pink circles).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.g005
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quite straightforward – Bayesian updates to the hidden causes at
the third level are mediated by precise prediction errors from the
second. Reducing the precision of these prediction errors subverts
this inference by reducing the potency of bottom up prediction
errors and the rate of evidence accumulation.
Discussion
In this paper, we have considered optimal oculomotor control in
the context of smooth pursuit eye movements and visual occlusion.
In particular, we have taken a Bayesian perspective on optimality
and have simulated various aspects of smooth pursuit using active
inference. Active inference depends upon a generative model of
stimulus trajectories and their active sampling through eye
movement. This requires a careful consideration of the generative
models that might be embodied by the visual-oculomotor system
and the sorts of behaviours one would expect to see under these
models. We hope to have shown that the sorts of anticipatory eye
movements seen in visual occlusion paradigms can be reproduced
using simulations of active inference with hierarchical models.
Crucially, these models enable hidden trajectories to be repre-
sented and updated dynamically during periods of visual occlusion
– and thereby inform anticipatory eye movements. We considered
how one might model the pathophysiology of disorders like
schizophrenia and account for the particular deficits shown by
schizophrenics in terms of smooth pursuit eye movements. In brief,
we have seen that a single change – a reduction in the precision or
certainty with which high-level beliefs about target motion are
held – provides a unifying explanation for performance deficits
and paradoxical advantages – and a failure to infer contextual
constraints or regularities that would otherwise improve perfor-
mance.
Crucially, this single change is not implausible, given current
understanding about the synaptic pathologies implicated in
schizophrenia. We have described elsewhere how precision is
encoded by synaptic gain of prediction error units in neuronal
models of predictive coding [1,71]. This suggests that a reduction
in high-level precision could be associated with abnormalities of
the synaptic gain of superficial pyramidal cells in higher cortical
areas, such as prefrontal cortex (PFC). Abnormalities in two
crucial determinants of synaptic gain in the PFC have long been
implicated in schizophrenia: dopaminergic activity [76] and
NMDA receptor function [45]. Dopaminergic and NMDA
receptors have complex and interacting roles in prefrontal cortex:
D1 receptor activation potentiates the slowly decaying and
voltage-dependent NMDA receptor conductance, whereas D2
Figure 6. Failure to infer high-level causes when precision is low. This figure shows the results of simulating numerous cycles of periodic
motion starting with a prior expectation about its frequency of zero. The panels on the left show the results of a simulation with normal precision,
while the right panels present the equivalent results under lower precision. These panels use the same format as Figure 3, including time which is
measured in 16 ms bins. The key result here is a failure to infer the true level (broken black lines in the lower left panels) of the hidden cause at the
highest level (blue lines) when precision is low (pink circles).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047502.g006
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receptors have the opposite effect – and a large literature shows
how the balance of D1 and D2 receptor activity could affect the
stability of attractor networks subserving working memory in PFC;
e.g. [77–80]. These biophysically informed models have shown
how D1 activity can reinforce currently active cell assemblies
whilst inhibiting the formation of new ones, and conversely D2
activity makes cell assemblies more flexible but much more
unstable and vulnerable to noise. This is precisely the effect of
reducing precision in the simulations above – rendering high-level
dynamics less stable and susceptible to other sources of prediction
error.
Building on the work of Weinberger and Goldman-Rakic
[81,82], another literature has evolved in parallel, modelling how
abnormalities of synaptic gain in this system could account for
many symptoms of schizophrenia. For example, Braver and
colleagues used a connectionist model to show how a noisy
dopamine signal could reproduce typical schizophrenic impair-
ments on the Continuous Performance Task (CPT) [83]. They
established this by increasing the variability of the gain with which
cue inputs drive PFC context units – that maintain a short-term
memory of the preceding cue for comparison with the current cue.
Durstewitz and Seamans point out that most accounts of psychosis
implicate higher D2 activity and hence a fragile and dysfunctional
working memory and the other dysexecutive problems associated
with the ‘disorganized’ syndrome [84]; although they add that
higher D1 activity – secondary to D1 receptor upregulation due to
chronic hypodopaminergia in PFC [85] could cause perseveration
and disengagement from motivational processes characteristic of
the ‘negative’ syndrome. Lastly, Rolls and colleagues used a
dynamical-systems framework to show how NMDA receptor
hypofunction could cause unstable attractor networks in different
areas of PFC, accounting for both cognitive symptoms (in
dorsolateral PFC) and negative symptoms (in orbitofrontal or
anterior cingulate cortex) [86].
Clearly, there are many aspects of oculomotor control and
schizophrenic pathophysiology we have ignored in this theoretical
work. For example, we have not addressed the general reduction
in oculomotor gain seen in schizophrenia prior to – or in the
absence of – occlusion. Non-specific effects of this sort can be
reproduced fairly easily, by reducing the precision at lower levels
of the hierarchy (results not shown). We will pursue this in future
work using visual targets that are degraded with high levels of
sensory noise. Here, we have chosen to focus on the profound and
specific deficits disclosed by visual occlusion. Another outstanding
area is the relationship between our active inference scheme and
previous models of oculomotor control. There is a slight
disconnect between active inference and classical models based
upon optimal control theory (e.g. [17]). This is because classical
models rely upon a cost or value function to specify optimal
trajectories. Active inference does not fall into this class of models
and does not require (user-specified) cost functions. Having said
this, there are some formal similarities between the optimal control
models and active inference – most notably the use of prediction
errors and state estimation. See [87] for a fuller discussion.
To conclude, we hope to have shown that reducing the
precision at high levels in a neurobiologically plausible hierarchical
inference scheme can reproduce some of the key schizophrenic
abnormalities of SPEM. We have demonstrated elsewhere (see
Table 1) that this model of brain function (based on generalised
filtering) is plausible and accounts for a wide variety of neuronal
processes and electrophysiological data. We argued that reducing
the high-level precision in this model – and hence its ability to
specify high-level predictions of the sensorium – is a realistic model
of schizophrenic pathology for both conceptual reasons (outlined
in the second section) and for the pathophysiological reasons
outlined above. The former include the close parallels between this
model and other theories of psychosis based on failures of
prediction; e.g., Frith’s account of passivity, reduced susceptibility
to illusions, differences in conditioning performance and electro-
physiological potentials and more recent Bayesian accounts; the
latter include the dopaminergic and NMDA receptor mediated
failures of prefrontal synaptic gain, which underpin many other
theories of schizophrenic symptoms. The associated functional
reduction in high-level precision – during hierarchical inference –
reproduced various characteristic schizophrenic SPEM abnormal-
ities: the reduction of gain during target occlusion, the poor
learning of target trajectories, and the slightly improved tracking of
unexpected changes in trajectory.
Further challenges remain. Among them is to use this model as
the basis for a dynamic causal model [88] of MEG signals and
simultaneous eye movement data from normal subjects perform-
ing smooth pursuit in the presence of occluders. If possible, we
shall also attempt to model the data generated by schizophrenics
and normal subjects undergoing pharmacological manipulations,
and – from the consequent changes in model parameters – we
ought to be able to make specific inferences about how synaptic
function differs in schizophrenia and how this impacts upon both
connectivity between brain regions [47] and the process of
inference itself [89].
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